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1. Introduction

Recent concern over Federal budget deficits has led to many public policy
proposals. Proposals range from short-term combinations of
proposals.
of tax-expen
tax-expenditure changes to long-term changes like a balanced
balanced budget
budget amendment
amendment and
line-item veto provisions for the President. Since much of
of the debate focuses
on alleged
alleged symptoms of
of unacceptably large deficits (high interest rates, high
values of
of the dollar and unfavorable trade balances), these proposals may
offer solutions that
that are temporary and, at best, offer only obscure routes
to eliminating the underlying sources of deficit growth. At worst, such
proposals may contribute to larger future deficits if they foster the underlyunderly
proposals
ing factors causing deficit growth.
Following work on the Federal sector in Manage
Manage and Marlow
Marlow (1986), we
examine the causal relation between expenditures and tax revenues at the
state and local levels of government. Manage
Manage and Marlow
Marlow (1986) provides
some evidence that
that Federal spending is determined by tax revenue. This
paper addresses the issue of whether or not the many different fiscal con
paper
constraints
be
straints that
that exist at the state and local level affect the causal relations between tax receipts and expenditures of
of those governments. Motivation for
our study stems from the frequently-made observation that, unlike their
Federal counterpart, the finances of
of state and
and local governments are rela
relatively well-behaved. Examination
Examination of
of causality may suggest how constitu
constitutional and legislative constraints have affected the finances of
of state and local
governments. In terms of
of policy implications, this examination may yield
information on the appropriatability of
of extending currently-existing con
constraints
straints at the state and local levels to the Federal level of
of government.
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of the U.S.
U.S. Department
Department of Treasury.
Treasury.

2. Tax
Tax revenue-expenditure
revenue-expenditure relations
relations l1
2.

Public finances are determined by political choices subject to various
constraints.
budget constraint facing governmental units consists of
constraints. The budget
direct and
balanced
and indirect tax receipts and debt; spending must always be balanced
by some combination
combination of these funding sources. Direct tax receipts are legis
legispoli
lated while indirect receipts are the product of
of inflation. Inflationary policies raise revenues by raising effective tax rates, allowing future debt
payments to be repayed with deflated currency and by directly exchanging
Treasury debt with cash or credits on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.
Whenever the sum of direct and indirect tax receipts is less than
than expendi
expenditures, the deficit must be financed by debt.
The question of how to test the revenue-expenditure relation is basically
a question of causality. One-way causality implies that one variable deter
determines the other. Two-way causality implies that
that both variables are simul
simultaneously determined. A straightforward
straightforward approach
approach to assigning causality
stems from the notion that
that funding constraints determine the spending
opportunity sets of goverments; that
that is, spending levels are ultimately deter
determined by budget (resource) levels. In the case of private citizens, the limits
of current consumption are determined by accumulated wealth, current
income and ability to borrow on projected future resources. In addition to
the power to create money, a goverment's ability to consume must also be
constrained by the same factors that confront private citizens.
The argument
argument for causality in the other direction appears less compelling.
For tax revenues to be determined by spending levels, the constraint would
be spending levels and the choice variable that
that reacts to that
that constraint
would be the funding level. Since the spending 'desires' of private citizens
are boundless, we expect the same to hold in the case of government units.
That is, since the study of economics argues that
that consumers are unable to
satisfy their unlimited (spending) 'wants',
'wants', how could government units
succeed to fund the unlimited 'desires' of the populace? Because 'desires'
are boundless, we must also argue that
that budgets are as well in the case of
spending choices determining (causing) the funding level. This does not
appear to be a useful approach. Moreover, within some feasible resource
constraint, government expenditure growth probably requires growing
direct tax levels since it is likely that a threshold point exists where the public
will either refuse to hold larger and
and larger public debt portfolios, or the
power to finance spending via inflation proves too onerous to economic or
political stability.
Our
Our expectation is that
that funding levels act as opportunity sets and deter
determine the existing resource choices that governments choose to consume.
Further, when the constraint is altered, the opportunity set is changed as

well. We expect a positive relation between opportunities and consumption;
whenever the opportunity set is broadened, governments grow in size. 22

3. Constraints
Constraints on government behavior

Differences in gross spending growth between different units of government
do not necessarily flow from dissimilar instinctive behaviors, but rather,
more likely, from more technical factors affecting the funding constraints
of governments. For example, there is no reason to expect different govern
government units, or bureaucrats for that matter, to choose significantly different
gross spending patterns when presented with identical funding constraints.
However, we might expect diverse gross spending behaviors between go
government units when operating under dissimilar funding constraints. 33 This
argument is similar in nature to the arguments in Brennan and Buchanan
(1977, 1980) that suggest constitutional changes in constraints facing any
form of Leviathan are necessary ingredients of any fundamental change in
Leviathan's behavior. Accordingly, dissimilar behaviors may be the out
outcome of dissimilar funding constraints.

3.1 Constraints at the Federal level
Major differences between observed public finances of the various units of
government may stem from their relative abilities to pursue inflationary
monetary policies. The power to inflate through money creation is only
awarded to the Federal Reserve System, a creation of Congress as a quasi
quasiFederal agency in 1913.
1913. As long as the Federal Reserve is willing,
willing, the Federal
government can fund expenditures through inflation. Even though just
another form of taxation, inflation represents a source of funding not readi
readily available to state and local governments. As such, the franchise of infla
inflation is a potential reason for any observed differences in the public finances
of Federal and state and local governments.
The importance of indirect tax receipts in the total funding constraint was
diminished in 1985
1985 when the Federal tax system became indexed for infla
inflation. However, to the extent that the index system underestimates the real
inflation rate, this revenue source plays a role, albeit a lesser role, in fi
financing spending. Another factor is the existence of a Federal debt
debtlimitation ceiling that has become binding in recent years. However, in all
cases, the ceiling has been raised to allow adequate funding for incurred
expenditures.
An additional factor affecting the Federal budget constraint is related to
the most recent concern over deficit spending. As discussed above, spending

is balanced
balanced by a combination of
of three revenue sources. Furthermore, the
optimal mix of
of their relative costs. As
of these funding sources is a function of
argued in Manage
Manage and Marlow (1986), these costs may be viewed as some
function of the ability to gain votes and reelection. The recent outcry over
deficit growth may be a product of a change in the relative cost of financing
spending growth through debt-issuance. Manage
Manage and Marlow (1986) sug
suggest possible reasons for this change in relative cost. The rapid rise in debt
debtissuance may have exceeded the threshold level whereby citizens begin to
perceive the growing claims on future resources, rising interest costs or
future inflation implied by growing levels of spending and debt. Growing
levels of debt may also make it more difficult to disguise the growth of
government from the general populace. Whatever the case, Manage
Manage and
Marlow (1986) argue that such changes could affect the character of
of the
constraint facing expenditure choices by altering the relative costs of
of the
various components of the total funding constraint.
constraintl
The most-recently legislated constraint is in the form of balanced budget
legislation mandating
mandating a balanced budget by 1991, aka the Gramm-Rudman
Gramm-Rudman
Amendment.
Amendment. By mandating
mandating successive years of progress toward a balanced
budget, its passage may affect the tax revenue - expenditure relation in the
following ways. One, if it alters tax revenue it would alter spending when
there is one-way causality running from receipts to expenditures or when
two-way causality exists. Two, it may force a change in the character of the
total funding constraint by making debt-issuance a relatively more costly
means of financing expenditure; raising direct tax receipts and inflation or
lowering expenditure growth would become relatively cheaper forms of
lowering deficits. Given its recent passage (December 12, 1985), it is too ear
earwhat real effect it will exert on future Federal finances. 44
ly to know what

3.2 Constraints at the state and local level
Unlike the Federal government, many states operate (over our sample pe
period) under legislative or constitutional
constitutional requirements that
that seek to constrain
deficits. Like the Federal government, many state governments are con
constrained, to varying qegrees,
degrees, by debt prohibitions or limitations. Given the
complexity of the differences among
among all of
of the various state and local go
government units, this section only attempts to summarize and compare some
of the more easily-recognizable issues facing funding constraints at the state
level. 55 Extension to the local level is well beyond the scope of the paper.
Only Connecticut and
and Vermont do not have constitutional or legislative
limitations on operating deficits. For example, 25 states limit the amount
amount
or kinds of debt they may sell; 20 states do not allow appropriations
appropriations to
exceed estimated revenues; 18 states require Governors to submit
submit balanced

expendibudgets; 19 states require revenue short-falls to be met by reduced expendi
ture; and 4 states require current debt to be paid by tax increases in the fol
following year. There also exist limits on nonoperating budget debt (19 states);
referendums to incur debt (4 states); and, dollar limits that can only be
exceeded by referendums (5 states).
On the surface, these requirements would appear to be driving forces
toward balanced budgets or restrained spending. However, just as at the
Federal level where extensions on debt limitation ceilings have reduced the
effective
effective constraint implied by ceilings on debt-issuance, the states appear
to have developed rather sophisticated avenues around these constraints.
The fact that state debt has risen faster than its federal counterpart over the
past 20 years represents possible evidence that constitutional or legislative
constraints on state government debt are weaker than previously thought. 66
Furthermore, even though more than three-fourths of state governments
operate under constitutions that explicitly prohibit or constrain long-term
indebtedness, every state has sold such debt.
A large number of 'creative' financing procedures have been invented by
politicians and bureaucrats to circumvent constraints on state finances.
States may earmark revenues to service the debt. Nonguaranteed debt has
also proved to be a successful means of evading legislative or constitutional
intent. In 1949, nonguaranteed debt comprised 15010
15% of total long-term state
debt; such debt now comprises over 50070
50% of the total and exceeds full faith
and credit debt in 28 states. 77
Circumvention through establishment of Off-Budget Enterprises has
received growing attention. 88 Bennett and DiLorenzo (1983) present evi
evidence on the rationale and development of public corporations and 'quasi'
'quasi'governmental units that seek to circumvent legislative and constitutional
constraints affecting state finance. The debt of these enterprises do not
require voter approval and are not subject to debt restrictions. Further
Furthermore, financial data on their activities often do not appear in the official
budgets of governments that created the 'quasi'-governmental unit.

3.3 Implications for empirical
empirical work
Government units are subject to heterogenous funding constraints. A com
complete list of the various limitations, prohibitions and requirements would
prove both long and varied. However, a companion list displaying the
ingenious methods that politicians and bureaucrats have invented to circum
circumvent the legislative and constitutional constraints would prove equally long
and inventive.
Implications for our empirical analysis follow. One, our analysis is not
affected to the extent that governments utilize creative financing methods

to fund on-budget spending. The choice to fund spending through debt, and
not current tax revenue, only affects the current mix of the total funding
level. That is, off-budget debt can be treated as 'legal' debt and does not
change current tax revenues. Two, even though expenditures
under
expefiditures may be underreported in the case of off-budget spending, current tax revenue is not used
to finance unreported expenditure data. However, to the extent that future
tax receipts or inflation fund this expenditure, the off-budget 'problem'
may produce noise in the expenditure-receipt data. Three, the existence of
off-budget spending affects our perception of the relative proclivities of
different government units toward deficits/surpluses. If, for example, state
hiding' significant portions of their expenditures
and local governments are'
are 'hiding'
through off-budget spending, then the size of their deficits/surpluses may
be distorted.

4. Granger causality
We use Granger's definition of causality to analyze the relation between
expenditures and tax receipts. The definition of causality in Granger (1969)
is based upon the predictability of a time series. If forecasts of a dependent
variable Y using both lagged values of Y and lagged values of another
variable X yield better forecasts than forecasts solely based on lagged values
of Y, then X is said to cause Y. In other words, if
2 (Y I Y)
( Y I YY,, X)
X) <
< a
0.2
Y)
a0.22 (Y

then X causes Y. The expression a022 (Y
(YII Y,
Y, X)
X) represents the variance of the
forecast error of Y obtained from the lagged values of both Y and X and
Y) represents the variance of the forecast error Y
the expression a022 (Y IIV/)
based solely on lagged values of Y. According if
o2(XIX, Y) < 02(XIX)

then Y causes X.
Two-way causality occurs when simultaneity
simultaneity exists between Y and X.
Causation runs from X to Y and from Y to X. Other terms used to describe
this form of interdependence include bidirectional causality and feedback.
Two-way causality occurs when
cr2 (YI Y, X) < 02 (YI V()

and

xlX
, Y) <
< a22 ((X
x l xI X)
)
a22 ((X
I X,

occur simultaneously.
simultaneously.
It should
should be noted
noted that
that Granger's (1969) definition
definition of
of causality assumes
that
predicting Y and
that information
information relevant to predicting
and X is contained
contained only in these
same variables. Spurious
Spurious causality may
m a y result when an unspecified
unspecified third
third
variable enters the model which causes both
both Y and
and X.
Further
Further detail on causality tests may
m a y be found in Box and
and Jenkins
Jenkins (1970),
Granger
Nelson and
Granger (1969), and
and Nelson
and Schwert
Schwert (1982). For
For a detailed
detailed critique
critique of
of
various problems associated with causality tests see Conway,
Conway, Swamy, Yana
Yanagida and
and Von
Von Zur
Zur Muehlin
Muehlin (1984).
We estimate the equations
equations
n
in
m
X tt =
c~j X tt__ jj +
+ .E
~j Y
Y tt -- jj +
+ U
Utt
-= E
~ (Xj
~ (3j
jj=
= l1
j=l
J=I
n

m

Y
~ 'Yj
+ .E
~ OJ
~j Y
Y tt -- jj +
+ V
Vtt
Ytt = E
3'3 Xtt -_j j +
jj=1
=l

(1)

]=1
j=l

(2)

where U and
uncorrelated and
and V are uncorrelated
and
E [Ut, Us] = O, E [Vt, Vs] = O, E [Ut, Vs] = 0 for all t ~ s.

Unidirectional,
Unidirectional, or one-way, causation
causation from X to Y is implied when
when the
set of
of estimated
estimated coefficients on the lagged X variables in (2) is statistically
different
when the set of
different from
f r o m zero as a group
group and
and when
of estimated
estimated coefficients
not statistically different
on the Y
Y variables in (1) is not
different from
f r o m zero.
Unidirectional causation
Y to X
X is implied when
when the set of
Unidirectional
causation from Y
of estimated
estimated
coefficients on the
the lagged Y
Y variables in (1) is statistically different
different from
from
zero as a group
X varivari
group and
and the set of
of estimated
estimated coefficients on
on the lagged X
not statistically different
ables in (2) is not
different from zero as a group.
group.
when the set of
Bidirectional causation
between X
X and
Y is implied when
Bidirectional
causation between
and Y
of esti
estimated coefficients on lagged Y
Y variables in (1) is statistically significant
mated
significant as
X variables in
a group
the set of
group and
and the
of estimated
estimated coefficients on
on the lagged X
(2) is also statistically significant
significant as a group.
group.

5. Empirical results
results

We apply the Granger
Granger causality test to annual
annual observations on nominal
nominal state
and
period
and local expenditures
expenditures E and
and nominal
nominal tax revenues R over the period
1952-82.
1952-82. Separate
Separate expenditure
expenditure and
and revenue series are available for state

Table 1. Granger's test of causality between expenditures and tax receipts
State level
E

on

R

R

on

E

Lag Form
Form

F-ratio'
F-ratio a

Degrees of
freedom

F-ratiobb

Degrees of
freedom

(2,2)
(3,3)
(4,4)
(5,5)

11.031 **
11.031**
11.733**
8.397**
5.689**

2,24
3,21
4,18
5,15

5.074*
1.847
1.598
0.807

2,29
3,21
4,18
5,15

Local level
E

on

R

R

on

E

Lag form

F-ratio

Degrees of
freedom

F-ratio

Degrees of
freedom

(2,2)
(3,3)
(4,4)
(5,5)

5.122*
5.122"
1.310
1.219
0.763

2,24
3,21
4,18
5,15

2.805
1.418
1.418
1.441
1.928

2,24
3,21
4,18
5,15

•*
••
**
•a
b

50/0 level.
Denotes significance at 5010
Denotes significance at 11%
% level.
Refers to F-test for joint significance of lagged R variables.
Refers to F-test for joint significance of lagged E variables.

and local governments. All data
data are obtained from Tax Foundation,
Foundation, Inc.
(1983) and the choice of
of time period is solely dictated by data
data availability
at time of
of examination. Checks on the residuals of
of the estimated equations
do not indicate significant serial correlation. As reported in Manage
Manage and
Marlow
Marlow (1986), symmetric lag structures ranging from two-to-five years are
considered here.
Table 1 summarizes the results of
of the Granger tests on state and local
data.
data. (See Appendices A and B detailed regression results). For
For the equa
equations with expenditures E as the dependent variable, the null hypothesis is
that the lagged values of tax receipts R do not improve the forecasts
tested that
of
of expenditures E over the one obtained on the basis of
of the lagged values
of expenditures E alone. For equations with tax receipts R as the dependent
variable, the null hypothesis is that
that the lagged values of
of expenditures E do
not improve the forecast of tax receipts R over the one obtained on the basis
of
of the lagged values of tax receipts R alone.
First, we discuss tests on the state data.
uni
data. The Granger test indicates uni-

directional causality that runs from tax receipts R to expenditures E for all
lag structures except the shortest (2,2). These results imply that the hypo
hypothesis that
that tax receipts R do cause expenditures E cannot be rejected at the
five percent level of
of significance. For the shortest lag length (2,2), the
Granger test indicates bidirectional causality, or feedback, between state
expenditures and tax receipts. Bidirectional causality suggests simultaneity
between expenditures E and
and tax receipts R so that one can not reject the
hypothesis that higher spending levels result from higher tax revenue levels.
That is, tax revenue and expenditure decisions are simultaneously deter
determined in the shortest lag length (2,2).
Second, we discuss tests on the local government data. The Granger test
indicates unidirectional causality that
that runs from tax receipts R to expendi
expenditures E, for the shortest lag length (2,2). However, for the remaining lag
lengths, no causality is indicated. That is, expenditures E and tax revenues
R appear to be independent of one another at the local level of government.
Consequently, the results of tests with symmetric lag structures ranging
from three-to-five years at the local level of government indicate that in
increases or decreases in tax revenue will exert no influence on expenditures
(and vice versa).

6. Concluding
Concluding remarks

The results of our tests indicate similarities between the expenditure-tax
receipt relations of
of state governments to those previously reported for the
Federal government in Manage
Manage and Marlow
Marlow (1986); the results reported here
indicate support
support for the hypothesis that
that tax receipts cause expenditures at
the state level of government. For tests utilizing symmetric lag structures
ranging from three to five years, state expenditures appear
appear to follow state
bidirec
tax receipts. For the shortest lag length (2,2), the determination of bidirecmake us reject the hypothesis that
tional causality does not make
that higher spending
levels result from higher revenue levels; rather, the causality appears to be
in both
both directions for the shortest lag length.
The finding that tax revenues and
and expenditures are not causally related
at the local level for the three longest lag structures is unexpected. However,
the result may be a product of an aggregation problem. The fact that all
local governments are aggregated on a state-by-state basis may generate
observations that
that are not useful for our empirical work. For example, if the
funding constraints of
of local governments on a state-by-state basis are espe
especially diverse, their aggregation to the state levCl
pro
level of
of observation may pro9
duce data
data that
that is not economically meaningfu1.
meaningful. 9 Nonetheless, the one case
where significant causality is observed lends some empirical support
support for the

hypothesis that
that tax receipts determine
d e t e r m i n e spending.
Two
proposals at all levels
T w o policy implications
i m p l i c a t i o n s are mentioned.
m e n t i o n e d . One,
One, policy proposals
of
of governments
g o v e r n m e n t s aimed at solving the occurence of
of unacceptably
u n a c c e p t a b l y large defi
deficits should consider the linkage between expenditures and
a n d tax receipts
before
before they recommend
r e c o m m e n d discretionary changes in either or both
b o t h of
of the com
compponents
o n e n t s of
of deficits: expenditures and
a n d tax receipts. For
F o r example, the results
of
of our
o u r tests do not
n o t rule out
out the notion
n o t i o n that
that a tax increase could ppromote
romote
expenditures that
that ultimately counter
c o u n t e r the deficit-reducing effect of
o f a given
tax hike.
Two,
Two, the fact that
that our
our results at the state level lend support
s u p p o r t for the view
that
that causality runs one-way
o n e - w a y from
f r o m expenditures to tax receipts suggests that
that
the many
m a n y dissimilarities in legislative and
a n d constitutional
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l constraints bbetween
etween
the Federal and
a n d state levels of
of government
g o v e r n m e n t may
m a y nnot
o t matter
m a t t e r much
m u c h in terms
of
A possible
of the causal rrelation
e l a t i o n bbetween
e t w e e n expenditures and
a n d tax revenues. A
reason for similarities in bbehavior
e h a v i o r may
m a y stem from
f r o m the circumvention
c i r c u m v e n t i o n of
of
legislative or constitutional
the state level of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l intent
i n t e n t at the
o f government
g o v e r n m e n t which
uultimately
l t i m a t e l y serve to weaken
w e a k e n differences between the effective constraints
facing Federal and
a n d state governments.
g o v e r n m e n t s . Moreover,
Moreover, it would be puzzling if we
found
f o u n d widely disparate behaviors between government
g o v e r n m e n t units in the absence
of
of significantly different constraints.

NOTES
1.
1. Much
Much of this discussion
discussion appears in Manage
Manage and Marlow
Marlow (1986).
(1986).
2. While
positive causality
While we
we expect
expect positive
causality from tax revenues
revenues to spending,
spending, causality tests
tests do not
constrain the direction
direction in any way.
way. That is, causality
causality tests help
help us to imply
imply direction.
3. Of course,
course, different government
government units can be expected
expected to allocate
allocate gross
gross resources
resources in diffe
different fashions
preferences.
fashions as related to subjective
subjective preferences.
4. Possibly
Possibly the most interesting
interesting question will
willbe whether
whether or not balanced budget legislation
legislation will
will
affect the growth of government
government (e.g.
(e.g. see
see Marlow,
Marlow, 1986).
1986). Without a spending
spending constraint
on government
government behavior, the books of government
government units could be balanced with high or low
expenditure-to-national income
income ratios. That is, a balanced budget will
will not necessarily
necessarilysolve
solve
problems or trends, associated
associated with a growing
growing government
government sector
sector - it may only disguise
disguise
some
some of its symptoms.
symptoms.
5. This section
section borrows liberally
liberally from Congressional
Congressional Budget
Budget Office
Office (1983).
(1983).
6. See Congressional
Congressional Budget
Budget Office (1983).
(1983).
7. See
See Congressional
Congressional Budget
Budget Office (1983).
(1983).
8. The phenomena of off-budget expenditure
expenditure has increasingly
increasingly been utilized
utilized by the Federal
government
government as a means
means of funding expenditure.
expenditure.
9. For example,
example, Manage
Manage and Marlow
Marlow (1985)
(1985) finds
finds positive
positive unidirectional
unidirectional causality
causality from
expenditures
expenditures to receipts
receipts for causality
causality tests
tests on aggregated
aggregated state and local data. That is, the
unit
unit of observation was state and local
local government
government units aggregated
aggregated to the state level.
level. How
However,
ever, it is
is difficult to know what that data represents
represents in terms of providing
providing information on
how individual
individual government
government units behave
behave in their finances.
finances. Consequently,
Consequently, the present paper
reflects
reflects a disaggregation
disaggregation in the data and, accordingly,
accordingly, a better sample
sample from which
which to imply
imply
causality
causality in
in the revenue-spending
revenue-spending relations of state
state and local
local governments.
governments.
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